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The Impact of Disability Benefits on Labor Supply: 
Evidence from the VA’s Disability Compensation Program†
By David H. Autor, Mark Duggan, Kyle Greenberg, and David S. Lyle*
Combining administrative data from the US Army, Department of 
Veterans Affairs, and Social Security Administration, we analyze 
the effect of the VA’s Disability Compensation (DC) program on 
veterans’ labor force participation and earnings. We study the 2001 
Agent Orange decision, a unique policy change that expanded DC 
eligibility for Vietnam veterans who served in theater but did not 
expand eligibility to other veterans of this era, to assess the causal 
effects of DC enrollment. We estimate that benefits receipt reduced 
veterans’ labor force participation by 18 percentage points, though 
measured income net of transfer income rose on average. (JEL H51, 
I12, I18, J14, J22, J28, J31)
The United States’ federal government provides income protection to individ-uals with disabilities through the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) 
and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs. More than 13 million disabled 
adults were enrolled in one or both of these programs in 2014 and benefits paid in 
that year were nearly $200 billion. A substantial literature investigates whether the 
low employment rates among program recipients reflect the effects of the programs 
or if instead SSDI and SSI simply provide support to individuals who would not 
otherwise be working. Estimating the effects of these two federal programs has been 
difficult because the eligibility rules and benefit formulas are uniform nationally. 
As a result, there is no natural non-eligible group to use as a basis for comparison.
A third major disability program in the US is available only to veterans of military 
service. Administered by the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the Disability 
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Compensation (DC) program pays benefits to veterans with medical  conditions that 
resulted from their military service. Nearly 4 million veterans received $54 billion 
in DC benefits in 2014, making total DC payments equivalent to total SSI payments 
in the same year (US Department of Veterans Affairs 2015 and US Social Security 
Administration 2015). Throughout the twentieth century, the DC program’s medical 
eligibility criteria and potential benefits were the same for all military veterans. But 
in the summer of 2001, the VA expanded the medical eligibility criteria for almost 
half of Vietnam-era veterans while leaving the program unchanged for other vet-
erans. This represented the first significant change to a federal disability program 
in the United States that applied to one clearly defined group of adults but not to 
another in the same age range.
The impetus for this change was a 2000 Institute of Medicine study that linked 
exposure to Agent Orange and other herbicides used by the US military during the 
Vietnam War to the onset of Type 2 Diabetes. As a result, diabetes was added to 
the list of covered conditions for Vietnam-era veterans who had served “in theatre” 
in Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos during the conflict. Vietnam-era veterans who did 
not serve in theatre were unaffected by this change. While the share of Vietnam-era 
veterans enrolled in the DC program had been trending up gradually prior to 2001, 
the adoption of the Agent Orange policy in 2001 coincided with a sharp acceleration 
in the fraction of Vietnam-era veterans receiving DC benefits (Figure 1). By 2014, 
more than 18 percent of Vietnam-era veterans were receiving DC benefits. No sim-
ilar changes in rates of DC enrollment occurred for veterans from earlier service 
eras.1
The VA’s adoption of the Agent Orange policy offers an unusual research oppor-
tunity: almost three decades after the end of the Vietnam War, veterans who served 
in theatre were unexpectedly granted presumptive eligibility for financially signif-
icant DC benefits without a precipitating change in health. Our analysis exploits 
the contrast in expanded benefits eligibility between in-theatre and not-in-theatre 
veterans to study the impact of benefits receipt on veterans’ labor supply. Adopting 
the terminology used by the military, we distinguish among “boots on the ground” 
(BOG) Vietnam-era veterans—the veterans directly affected by the Agent Orange 
policy—and “not on ground” (NOG) veterans, whose DC benefit eligibility was not 
expanded. We analyze unique administrative data for a sample of more than 4 mil-
lion US Army veterans to compare the evolution of labor market outcomes among 
BOG veterans to other Vietnam-era veterans who did not serve in theatre during 
the Vietnam conflict (NOG). By using other Vietnam-era veterans as our compar-
ison group, we account for the possibility that veterans would have retired sooner 
(or later) than nonveterans for reasons unrelated to the DC program. Data prior to 
2001 allows us to account for possible differential trends between BOG and NOG 
veterans.
1 Recent veterans account for an even larger fraction of the growth in DC enrollment over the past 15 years. The 
number of Gulf War-era veterans enrolled in DC increased from 0.32M in 2000 to 1.68M in 2014, while the number 
of Vietnam-era veterans enrolled in DC increased from 0.74M to 1.32M during the same timeframe. By compar-
ison, the number of DC recipients from other eras (mostly WWII, Korean, and Peacetime-era veterans) declined 
from 1.24M to 0.96M (US Department of Veterans Affairs 2001 and 2015). See Duggan, Rosenheck, and Singleton 
(2010) for a comparison of Vietnam veterans to those from earlier service eras. 
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A large body of research, surveyed in Bound and Burkhauser (1999), investigates 
the effects of the SSDI and SSI programs on labor supply and other outcomes.2 
There has been much less research on the VA’s Disability Compensation program. 
Autor and Duggan (2007); Autor, Duggan, and Lyle (2011); and Coile, Duggan, 
and Guo (2015) use data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to explore how 
labor force participation changed for male Vietnam-era veterans relative to similarly 
aged nonveteran males after the 2001 policy change. All three studies demonstrate a 
significantly larger decline in labor force participation among Vietnam-era veterans 
in the post-2001 period, though their confidence intervals are compatible with a 
wide range of effect sizes.3
A broad concern with this body of evidence is that veterans might retire sooner 
than nonveterans for reasons unrelated to the DC program. Using the Vietnam-era 
draft lottery as an instrumental variable for Vietnam-era military service, Angrist, 
Chen, and Frandsen (2010) estimate that employment was lower and transfer income 
receipt was higher among low-skilled veterans than among low-skilled  nonveterans. 
2 Absent a natural non-eligible group to use as a basis for estimating the causal effect of SSDI, recent research 
has used variation in the propensity to award disability benefits across disability examiners (Maestas, Mullen, and 
Strand 2013; Autor et al. 2015) and administrative law judges (French and Song 2014). Our paper is closer in spirit 
to Gruber (2000), who analyzes the impact of disability benefits on labor supply in Canada in the 1980s and 1990s 
by contrasting Quebec (no expansion of benefits) with the rest of Canada (expanded benefits). 
3 Duggan, Rosenheck, and Singleton (2010) use five years of data from the Veterans’ Supplement of the CPS to 
compare changes in labor force participation among Vietnam veterans who served in theater and other Vietnam-era 
veterans. Given the small sample size, their estimates are very imprecise, as their confidence interval includes the 
full range of possible effect sizes (zero effect or a one-for-one reduction in labor force participation). 
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Figure 1. Number and Percentage of Veterans Enrolled in DC
notes: This figure reports the percentage of Vietnam-era veterans enrolled in the Veterans Disability Compensation 
(DC) program (left axis) and annual DC Expenditures per living veteran (right axis). The numbers above the first 
series indicate the number of Vietnam-era veterans enrolled in DC in 1988, 2001, and 2014.
Source: Prior to 1999, all data is from Annual Statistical Abstracts of the United States. From 1999 through 2014, 
annual DC enrollment information is from Veterans Benefits Administration Annual Reports. The annual number of 
living veterans is from VetPop2007, VetPop2010, and VetPop2014.
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They hypothesize that the lower employment rate of Vietnam-era veterans is due 
to the availability of Veterans Disability Compensation benefits. In related work on 
the labor supply of veterans, Boyle and Lahey (2010) study the expansion of the 
Veterans Health Insurance program to non-disabled veterans in the mid-1990s to 
analyze changes in labor force participation stemming from increased real incomes 
and reductions in “job lock.”
Using individual-level data from the US Department of Veterans Affairs, we doc-
ument that DC receipt and enrollment growth were higher among BOG than NOG 
veterans prior to 2001, but these gaps were relatively stable. After 2001, however, 
the rate of DC enrollment grew much more rapidly among BOG veterans, as shown 
in Figure 2. Between 2000 and 2006, the ratio of DC receipt among BOG rela-
tive to NOG veterans rose from approximately two-to-one to three-to-one: almost 
 one-in-four BOG veterans in our analysis sample received DC benefits in 2006 ver-
sus one-in-twelve among veterans in our NOG sample. This trend break was driven 
primarily by a sharp increase in the number of diabetes awards to BOG veterans. 
In fact, DC enrollment growth among BOG veterans shows essentially no break in 
trend when one excludes DC recipients with a diabetes diagnosis (Figure 2). Using 
matched data from the Social Security Administration, we also document a differen-
tial increase in SSDI enrollment after 2001 among BOG veterans. A plausible chan-
nel for this effect, which is about one-tenth as large as the corresponding change in 
DC enrollment, is that receipt of Veterans Disability Compensation benefits eases 
financial constraints associated with exiting the labor force and applying for SSDI 
benefits. Moreover, since SSA regulations require disability adjudicators to  consider 
disability decisions of other federal agencies (US General Accounting Office 2009), 
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Figure 2. Percentage of BOG and NOG Veterans Enrolled in DC
notes: This figure reports the annual percentage of BOG and NOG veterans enrolled in DC between 1998 and 2006. 
“BOG, DC without diabetes” reports the percentage of veterans in the BOG sample who were enrolled in DC but 
did not receive benefits for diabetes. “NOG, DC without diabetes” reports the percentage of veterans in the NOG 
sample who were enrolled in DC but did not receive benefits for diabetes. The small drop in BOG veterans enrolled 
in DC but without a diabetes award between 2001 and 2002 occurs because some BOG veterans who enrolled in 
DC prior to 2001 received benefits for diabetes after the policy change.
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a veteran’s enrollment in DC may also increase the likelihood that he or she applies 
for and ultimately receives Social Security disability benefits.
By generating a sharp differential increase in DC enrollment among BOG vet-
erans for reasons unrelated to changing health, the Agent Orange policy change 
permits a causal estimation of the effect of DC program participation on the labor 
supply of near-elderly Vietnam veterans. Analyzing this policy-induced variation, 
we find that labor force participation, defined as having strictly positive earnings for 
the year in our administrative data, declined sharply among BOG relative to NOG 
veterans soon after the 2001 policy change. The results are similar for younger (born 
1949–1951) and older (born 1946–1948) Vietnam-era veterans in our analysis sam-
ple, suggesting that this pattern reflects an effect of the policy rather than a tendency 
of BOG veterans to retire sooner than their NOG counterparts for reasons unrelated 
to the DC program. For every 100 individuals who enter the DC program as a result 
of the policy change, we estimate that 18 drop out of the labor force. The magnitude 
of this decline reflects in part the size of the cash transfers that DC beneficiaries 
receive. Among veterans who entered the DC program after 2001, annual benefits 
averaged $10,000 in the first year of enrollment and $17,000 in the fifth year of 
enrollment. Since DC benefits are not subject to state or federal taxation, their after 
tax value is roughly equivalent to $1.30 to $1.50 in pretax earned income, depend-
ing upon the recipient’s marginal tax rate. Indeed, the increase in disability benefit 
income among BOG veterans more than offsets (on average) the reduction in earn-
ings among BOG veterans, so that total incomes of BOG relative to NOG veterans 
rose steadily after 2001. Combining our labor force participation and benefit receipt 
estimates, we obtain an estimate of the income elasticity of labor force participa-
tion of −0.49, which is in step with the participation elasticity calculated by Boyle 
and Lahey (2010), who studied labor supply of older nondisabled veterans ages 55 
through 64 who were granted access to VA health insurance in the mid-1990s.
Distinct from the SSDI program, which provides income replacement for bene-
ficiaries who are unable to work due to disability, veterans receive DC benefits as 
compensation for service-related reductions in health and thus, for the most part, are 
not contingent on veterans’ past or present employment. This observation suggests 
that any DC-induced reduction in labor supply that we detect would be attributable 
to a non-incentive income effect. However, nearly 15 percent of BOG veterans who 
were receiving DC by the end of our sample window were receiving maximum 
DC benefits of approximately $2,900 monthly because they were deemed unable to 
work (“Individually Unemployable” or IU) due to their disability. Both for veterans 
receiving the IU benefit and for those seeking it, the labor supply effects that we 
estimate are likely to encompass both income and incentive effects.
I. The Veterans Disability Compensation Program:  
Eligibility, Benefits, and Work Incentives
The DC program pays cash benefits and provides prioritized access to VA health 
facilities to military veterans with service-connected medical conditions, mean-
ing that they are caused or aggravated by their military service. Unlike SSDI and 
SSI, federal programs that classify disability using a categorical (all-or-nothing) 
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 determination, the DC program rates disability on a discrete scale with 11 gra-
dations ranging from 0 to 100 percent in 10 percent increments. Ratings depend 
on the type and severity of the disability, with more severe conditions receiving a 
higher rating.4
A. Eligibility and Benefits
Veterans seeking DC benefits apply to 1 of 56 regional offices of the Veterans 
Benefits Administration (VBA), which collects necessary information and for-
wards the information to a Rating Board. For each disability claimed, the Rating 
Board determines whether the disability is verified, whether it is service connected, 
and if so, what rating it merits. During the 2000 fiscal year, more than 70 percent 
of those applying for DC sought benefits for more than one medical condition 
(US Department of Veterans Affairs 2001). In 2006, current DC beneficiaries aver-
aged 2.97 disabilities per recipient, with the highest number of disabilities per capita 
among Gulf War and Vietnam-era veterans, and the lowest number among WWII 
veterans (US Department of Veterans Affairs 2007).
Monthly DC benefits are an increasing and convex function of the veteran’s 
Combined Disability Rating (CDR). In 2014, a CDR of 10 provided a monthly 
payment of $131, whereas a CDR of 100 provided a monthly payment of $2,858.5 
Veterans receiving a CDR of 30 or higher and who have spouses, dependent chil-
dren, or surviving parents also receive modest additional benefits. In the modal case 
where a veteran receives benefits for multiple service-connected disabilities, the 
veteran’s CDR is an increasing, concave function of the individual ratings, where 
concavity prevents the combined rating from exceeding 100.6
The VBA also considers employment capability for veterans with severe disabil-
ities. Veterans who have single disabilities rated at 60 percent or above, or a com-
bined disability rating of at least 70 and one disability rated at least 40, can qualify 
for the Individual Unemployability (IU) designation if VBA determines that they 
are unable “to secure and follow a substantially gainful occupation by reason of 
 service-connected disability.” Veterans with the IU designation receive cash pay-
ments at the 100 percent CDR level even if their CDR is less than 100 percent.7
4 Type 2 diabetes ratings can range from 10 to 100 percent. Many medical conditions have specific ratings, 
detailed in the Web Automated Reference Material System (WARMS) database http://www.warms.vba.va.gov/
bookc.html. 
5 The stated policy of the VBA is that the DC benefits schedule reflects the average reduction in earnings capac-
ity for each value of the CDR. Since benefits determination depends only on CDR and family status, the benefit 
payment will exceed the earnings loss for some veterans and fail to meet the earnings loss of others. In 2014, the 
monthly benefit schedule (by CDR) was: $131 (10 percent), $259 (20 percent), $401 (30 percent), $578 (40 per-
cent), $822 (50 percent), $1,041 (60 percent), $1,312 (70 percent), $1,526 (80 percent), $1,714 (90 percent), and 
$2,858 (100 percent). 
6 In the case of multiple disabilities, the claimant’s “residual ability” is used to determine the incremental effect 
of each disability on the CDR. If, for example, a veteran has two disabilities each rated at 50 percent, his CDR 
would be equal to the sum of 50 percent for the first disability and 50 percent of his residual capacity (also 50 
percent) for the second disability, rounded to the nearest increment of 10 percent. Thus, two disabilities rated at 50 
percent results in a CDR of [50% + (100% − 50%) × 0.5] = 75%, which is then rounded up to 80 percent. 
7 The VBA also indirectly considers employment capability when determining ratings for mental disorders. 
According to subpart B—Disability Ratings, 38 U.S.C. §4.130, stipulates that the rating criteria for mental disor-
ders depends on a veteran’s degree of “social and occupational impairment.” 
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DC benefits generally do not offset and are not offset by other federal transfer 
benefits, and, once awarded, are rarely retracted. Unlike federal SSDI benefits, DC 
benefits do not terminate when a recipient reaches retirement age, even for recipi-
ents receiving the IU benefit. Moreover, a veteran’s ongoing receipt of DC benefits 
is neither work-contingent nor income-contingent, except in the case that a veteran 
is seeking or has received the IU rating.8 DC benefits are also not subject to federal 
income or payroll tax, which further increases their effective value, as noted above. 
DC benefits are thus roughly akin to an inflation-indexed annuity that provides 
monthly payments for as long as a veteran remains alive.
Appendix Table 1 summarizes DC cash benefits paid to all veterans in fiscal year 
2006, the final year for which we have individual-level DC data in the analyses 
below. The average annual payment to the 2.73 million DC recipients in this year 
was $11,038 per capita, totaling approximately $30.1 billion for the year. Veterans 
with ratings between 0 and 20 percent accounted for 44 percent of recipients but 
just 8 percent of dollars paid. Those with ratings at 70 percent or above comprised 
21 percent of the population and received 62 percent of the benefits payments.
Total DC benefits payments in constant 2014 dollars rose from $21.1 billion to 
$54.2 billion between 2001 and 2014. Simultaneously, the estimated veteran pop-
ulation declined from 26.1 million to 22.0 million (US Department of Veterans 
Affairs 2002 and 2015). As a result of these changes, real annual DC expenditures 
per living veteran increased by 200 percent (from $810 to $2,460) while the fraction 
of veterans receiving benefits approximately doubled (from 9 to 18 percent).
B. Work incentives under DC
The graduated scale of DC disability ratings creates a complex set of incentives. 
Though disability ratings notionally depend exclusively on medical criteria rather 
than employment status, veterans may nevertheless perceive that their disabilities will 
receive higher ratings if they are not employed when applying to obtain or increase ben-
efits. Veterans also face an incentive to repeatedly reapply to increase their Combined 
Disability Ratings as their health conditions evolve.9 Appendix Table 2 shows that vet-
erans’ CDRs and benefit levels tend to rise steeply in the years following enrollment. 
This pattern of rapidly escalating benefits following enrollment suggests that policies 
that induce veterans to obtain an initial DC award, even at a low CDR, may lead to sub-
stantially larger claims and discourage labor force participation over the longer term.
The availability of the Individual Unemployability designation is apt to amplify 
these incentives. The IU benefit has significant monetary value: a 2006 General 
Accounting Office report found that the average present discounted incremental 
value of receiving an IU award in 2005 was approximately $300,000 to $460,000 
for veterans age 20 (net of existing benefits), and was $89,000 to $142,000 for veter-
ans age 75 (US GAO 2006). The availability of this benefit appears likely to induce 
8 A Veteran may receive both DC and SSDI payments without any reduction in benefits from either program, 
though SSI payments will generally be reduced or eliminated by DC payments. 
9 In fact, we observe very few reductions in CDRs in our data, and it is possible that those few that exist reflect 
coding errors. Veterans face little risk of having their CDRs reduced after the initial award. 
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at least some subset of work-capable veterans to curtail labor force participation to 
qualify. Once the IU designation is awarded, veterans face an incentive to maintain 
low earnings since a veteran can lose the IU rating if his annual labor market earn-
ings (measured by SSA earnings data) exceeds a threshold amount, which was equal 
to $6,000 in 2004 and 2005 (US GAO 2006).
The DC program may also alter work incentives through its interactions with 
other federal benefits programs, SSDI in particular. Though the DC and SSDI pro-
grams have distinct disability screening criteria, the medical information generated 
by the DC award may alert some veterans that they suffer from impairments that 
could merit an SSDI award (and vice versa). Receipt of DC benefits may also make 
the SSDI application process less financially onerous, since SSDI applicants must 
remain out of the labor force for at least five months before receiving SSDI benefits. 
Because cash benefits from the two programs are additive rather than offsetting, it 
is plausible that a veteran’s receipt of either DC or SSDI benefits increases his odds 
of applying for the other.10
II. The 2001 Agent Orange Decision, Type 2 Diabetes, and ‘Service-Connectedness’
For a disability to be classified as service-connected, it must be “a result of dis-
ease or injury incurred or aggravated during active military service.” This criterion 
makes it straightforward for a veteran to obtain compensation for a tangible injury 
that occurs during military service but significantly more difficult to obtain compen-
sation for a disease that develops later in life, such as cancer or heart disease. Thus, 
in 2006, the five most prevalent service-connected disabilities were primarily battle 
traumas: hearing defects, tinnitus, general musculoskeletal disorders, arthritis due 
to trauma, and scars (US Department of Veterans Affairs 2006). Nevertheless, dis-
abilities that typically develop post-service are also prevalent: post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) and hypertensive vascular disease (high blood pressure) were the 
sixth and ninth most prevalent service-connected disabilities in 2006.
In November of 2000, type 2 diabetes was added to the list of compensable and 
presumptively service-connected impairments for Vietnam veterans who had served 
in theater due to their potential exposure to the herbicide Agent Orange. This decision 
followed the publication of two studies in 1999 and 2000 that found an association 
between dioxin exposure and diabetes (Calvert et al. 1999 and Air Force Health Study 
2000). Reversing a long-maintained position, the National Academy of Sciences’ 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) concluded in 2000 that there was “limited/suggestive 
evidence of an association between exposure to the herbicides used in Vietnam or the 
contaminant dioxin and type 2 diabetes” (IOM 2000). Publication of these studies 
prompted the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to classify type 2 diabetes as presump-
tively service connected for Vietnam-era veterans who served in-theater.
Our analysis exploits the contrast in expanded benefits eligibility between 
 in-theater and not-in-theater Vietnam-era veterans to study the impact of  benefits 
10 The combination of VA health benefits and Medicare benefits from SSDI may also be more attractive than 
either individually since VA and Medicare differ in ailments covered, rapidity of access to treatment, size of 
 co-payments, and coverage of prescription drugs. 
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receipt on veterans’ labor supply. More broadly, we document how a pol-
icy change that reclassified a commonplace but typically non-severe disorder as 
 service-connected catalyzed a surge in DC enrollment, whereby a large fraction of 
new enrollees obtained very high disability ratings—including 100 percent disabil-
ity and Individual Unemployability—within a handful of years.
III. Data and Analytic Sample
Our analysis draws on a unique set of linked administrative data sources. The first 
is a near census of approximately four million veterans who left the Army between 
1968 and 1985. The US Army’s Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis 
(OEMA) constructed this database by combining two files from the Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC): the first DMDC file enumerates essentially every 
person who left the Army between 1968 and 1985 (designated as the service mem-
ber’s “loss year”); OEMA then merged this “loss year” file with DMDC’s Vietnam 
file, which identifies the vast majority of veterans who served in the Vietnam theater. 
Online Reference Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics on the distribution of 
loss years, years-of-birth, and start years for military service.
To measure DC participation, OEMA obtained from the VA detailed informa-
tion about veterans’ enrollment and DC benefits received from VA programs in 
September of each year from 1998 through 2006. To account for mortality, OEMA 
merged their data to the Social Security Administration Death Master File (DMF), 
which includes the year of death for any individual in the sample who died prior to 
2008. According to DMF data, approximately 13 percent of the 4.1 million indi-
viduals in the sample were deceased by late 2007. To collect employment, earn-
ings, SSDI, and SSI information, OEMA contracted with the US Social Security 
Administration (SSA) to match veterans in the OEMA dataset to enumerate wage 
earnings and Social Security benefits in each year from 1976 through 2007. This 
resulted in a successful match for 3.8 million of the 4.1 million veterans in the full 
dataset, with overall match rates exceeding 90 percent for both BOG and NOG sam-
ples, as detailed in online Reference Table 3.
Confidentiality rules prevent SSA from disclosing individual earnings or benefits 
data. SSA instead provided statistics on earnings and benefits for cells containing 
five to nine veterans, including: the number of cell members with zero earnings; 
mean labor earnings; the number receiving SSDI and SSI; and mean SSDI and SSI 
benefit amounts. In constructing cells, we grouped individuals with similar back-
ground characteristics, including gender, race, BOG and NOG status, and year of 
birth. Our final analysis sample consists of veterans who joined the military between 
1966 and 1971 and were born between 1946 and 1951. The Data Appendix provides 
additional details on sample selection and cell construction.
Panel A of Table 1 compares the BOG and NOG samples. The fraction nonwhite 
is approximately equal in the two samples (11.3 and 11.8 percent, respectively), 
as is the fraction with positive earnings in 1998 (84.3 and 85.1 percent). Among 
those with a non-missing Armed Forces Qualification Test score (AFQT), average 
scores are also relatively close (52.1 and 53.4). And by construction, the average 
 year-of-birth and the average start year are comparable in the two groups. There 
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are also clear differences between the BOG and NOG samples. BOG veterans are 
more than twice as likely as NOG veterans to be receiving DC benefits in 2000 (14.2 
 versus 6.4 percent), just prior to the 2001 policy change. This may in part reflect the 
toll of military service for those who served in the Vietnam theater.11
11 Members of the NOG sample are more likely to have missing data on education and less likely to have miss-
ing AFQT score data. 
Table 1—Sample Means for BOG and NOG Full and SSA Verified Samples
Panel A. SSA verified sample   Panel B. Full sample
  (1) BOG (2) NOG   (1) BOG (2) NOG
Verified in SSA data (percent) 100.0 100.0 95.7 89.0
Year of birth 1,948.4 1,948.6 1,948.4 1,948.7
Army start year 1,968.4 1,969.0 1,968.4 1,969.0
Army loss year 1,971.1 1,971.4 1,971.1 1,971.4
Deceased by 1997 (percent) 4.8 2.9 6.2 6.1
Deceased by 2006 (percent) 9.9 7.9 11.5 11.0
Observations 765,849 585,016 806,698 659,283
race, AFQT, and education (at military entry)
Nonwhite (percent) 11.3 11.8 11.8 12.7
AFQT score 52.1 53.4 51.7 52.5
Missing AFQT score (percent) 26.4 19.1 25.8 17.7
HS dropout (percent) 31.4 23.3 31.4 24.3
HS grad (percent) 48.1 37.1 48.3 38.0
Some college (percent) 14.5 14.4 14.3 14.2
College grad or higher (percent) 4.8 9.2 4.7 8.6
Missing education (percent) 1.1 15.3 1.2 14.3
Labor force status
Positive earnings 1998 (percent) 84.3 85.1
Positive earnings 2000 (percent) 82.8 84.1
Positive earnings 2006 (percent) 71.3 74.4
ln(cell mean earnings) 1998 10.69 10.71
ln(cell mean earnings) 2000 10.67 10.71
ln(cell mean earnings) 2006 10.38 10.46
Disability receipt and benefits
DC receipt 1998 (percent) 13.5 6.3 13.5 6.2
DC receipt 2000 (percent) 14.3 6.5 14.2 6.4
DC receipt 2006 (percent) 23.0 7.6 22.9 7.5
Mean annual DC payment 1998 1,589 771 1,601 778
Mean annual DC payment 2000 1,931 870 1,943 876
Mean annual DC payment 2006 3,969 1,220 3,971 1,227
Mean annual DC pay 1998 if > 0 10,700 10,155 10,772 10,302
Mean annual DC pay 2000 if > 0 12,275 10,925 12,337 11,066
Mean annual DC pay 2006 if > 0 16,194 12,746 16,241 12,863
SSDI receipt 1998 (percent) 5.6 4.6
SSDI receipt 2000 (percent) 6.8 5.5
SSDI receipt 2006 (percent) 12.6 9.7
SSI receipt 1998 (percent) 0.7 1.0
SSI receipt 2000 (percent) 0.7 1.0
SSI receipt 2006 (percent) 0.7 1.3      
notes: Panel A reports summary statistics for veterans in the BOG and NOG samples described in Section III and 
the Data Appendix. Panel B includes veterans who did not verify with the Social Security Administration but makes 
all other sample restrictions described in the Data Appendix. Earnings and DC payment values are in 2014 dol-
lars. Disability, employment, and earnings information only reflect living veterans. All sample members were born 
between 1946 and 1951 and commenced Army service between 1966 and 1971.
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An examination of trends in key outcome variables in the BOG and NOG samples 
prior to 2001 reveals many similarities: the fraction with zero earnings increased by 
similar, though not identical, amounts for both samples between 1998 to 2000 (by 
1.5 and 1.0 points for BOG and NOG samples, respectively), as did the fraction 
receiving SSDI benefits (1.2 and 0.9 points for BOG and NOG samples). Our anal-
ysis will control for any differential trends in outcome variables that precede the 
policy change.
A remaining concern with the primary analytic sample is that individuals who are 
matched in the SSA data may systematically differ from those who are not. This is 
especially an issue for veterans who died prior to 1997. As shown in columns 1 and 
2 of panel B in Table 1, the fraction of veterans in the full sample who were deceased 
as of 1997 was 6.2 and 6.1 percent in the full BOG and NOG samples but only 4.8 
and 2.9 percent in the SSA verified samples—though, notably, the fraction of vet-
erans who died between 1997 and 2007 in the BOG and NOG samples is closely 
comparable in both the full sample and the SSA verified sample. The lower SSA 
match rate for deceased veterans is a consequence of SSA’s record matching criteria, 
which requires a match on subjects’ full names, SSN, and date of birth. Due to poor 
optical character recognition, the NOG data contained a relatively high frequency 
of garbled names. We worked with the credit information provider TransUnion to 
obtain names for those with incomplete information.12 Due to limited availability 
of archival credit information prior to 1997, TransUnion could not provide names 
for most veterans who passed away before that year, leading to a low overall match 
rate for NOG soldiers who died prior to 1997. Differential mortality match for the 
BOG and NOG samples is not a major threat to the validity of our research design, 
however, since our primary focus is on outcomes from 1998 forward.13 Thus, sol-
diers who were deceased as of 1997 from both BOG and NOG samples are excluded 
from the analysis.
To benchmark the representativeness of the sample, we compare the OEMA data 
with a similarly drawn group of male veterans from the 2000 IPUMS Census file. 
Using the 5 percent Census IPUMS extract, we draw a group of all males born 
between 1946 and 1951, limiting to (self-reported) Vietnam-era veterans. Appendix 
Table 3 provides a side-by-side comparison of age, race, schooling, annual earnings, 
and share with nonzero earnings in the OEMA and census samples. Race and labor 
force participation rates are closely comparable: the fractions of the OEMA and 
census samples with nonzero earnings are 84.1 percent and 82.3 percent, respec-
tively, while the percent nonwhite are 11.3 and 13.3. Reflecting the fact that OEMA 
data capture education at the time of military enlistment (average age of 20) while 
the census data reflect educational attainment in late adulthood, the OEMA sample 
reports considerably lower educational attainment than the census sample. Average 
earnings in the OEMA sample are also about 10 percent lower than in the census 
sample. This gap may reflect earnings differences between Army veterans and those 
12 TransUnion performed this work pro bono. Our original sample had 1.7 million observations with a missing 
name. TransUnion was able to provide names for 1.5 million of these observations upon confirming a match with 
date of birth and social security number. 
13 A post-reform analysis showed that changes to labor force participation cannot be attributed to differential 
mortality between the BOG and NOG samples. 
42 AmEriCAn ECOnOmiC JOUrnAL: AppLiED ECOnOmiCS JULy 2016
of other branches of the military. SSA data may also fail to capture some earnings 
sources, including self-employment and non-covered work. Overall, our compari-
son of OEMA and census data provides some assurance that the OEMA sample is 
representative of the target population of Vietnam-era Army veterans, measured in 
terms of age, race, labor force participation, and earnings.
IV. The Impact of the Agent Orange Policy on Receipt of Disability Benefits
As described above, the Agent Orange policy spurred a steep rise in Disability 
Compensation enrollment and may have had spillover effects on enrollment in other 
federal disability programs. We focus our study on the subsequent effects of this pol-
icy by estimating impacts on DC enrollment, SSDI and SSI enrollment, and finally, 
total federal disability benefits.
A. Enrollment in Veterans Disability Compensation
Recall from Figure 2 that prior to the Agent Orange change in 2001, DC enroll-
ment was rising somewhat more rapidly among BOG than NOG veterans. But DC 
enrollment among BOG veterans accelerated substantially after 2001. Panel A of 
Table 2 shows that BOG DC enrollment increased by 0.4 percentage points per year 
between 1998 and 2000 (from 13.5 to 14.3) and by 1.6 percentage points annually 
between 2001 and 2006 (from 15.0 to 23.0). In contrast, DC enrollment growth 
among NOG veterans remained small and relatively steady, increasing from 0.1 per-
centage points per year between 1998 and 2000 (from 6.3 to 6.5) to 0.2 percentage 
points per year between 2001 and 2006 (from 6.6 to 7.6).14 Data from the National 
Health Interview Survey (Schiller et al. 2010) indicate that the fraction of individu-
als with diabetes varies substantially by race, with rates among blacks substantially 
higher than among whites. Consistent with this fact, an examination of the trends 
in DC enrollment in Table 2 reveals that DC enrollment increased about 40 percent 
more among BOG nonwhites (from 19.3 to 30.2, a rise of 10.9 percentage points) 
than among BOG whites from 2001 to 2006 (from 14.4 to 22.1, a rise of 7.7 per-
centage points).15
These BOG-NOG contrasts in DC enrollment may reflect differences in veteran 
characteristics as well as any impact of the Agent Orange policy. To account for 
these factors, we estimate a set of OLS models that regress DC enrollment on a 
full set of controls for veterans’ year-of-birth, race, and AFQT score quintile.16 For 
consistency with the subsequent analysis of labor market outcomes, our DC vari-
ables are calculated as means over five to nine veterans grouped at the level of SSA 
14 The policy change took effect in July 2001 and we measure DC enrollment in September. Thus, our 2001 data 
is arguably more “pre” than “post,” though it’s likely that the policy change did contribute to DC enrollment growth 
between September 2000 and September 2001 in our data. 
15 The proportional increases among blacks and whites were similar, about 50 percent between 2001 and 2006. 
However, the proportional increase was much larger among BOG than NOG veterans: 53 versus 15 percent. 
16 Veterans with low AFQT scores are more likely to enroll in DC (Autor, Duggan, and Lyle 2011), and average 
scores differ slightly between BOG and NOG veterans. 
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 reporting cells. We estimate the following equation for 1998 through 2006, weight-
ing each cell-year by the number of veterans in the cell:
(1)  y jt =  α t +  γ 0 × BO G j +  ∑ 1999 2006  γ t × BO G j +  X jt ′ β t +  ε jt .
The outcome variable  y jt is the percentage of cell  j enrolled in the DC program 
in September of year  t , and  BO G j is an indicator variable that is set equal to one 
if veterans in cell  j are in the BOG sample, and is otherwise equal to zero (cells 
include either all BOG or all NOG veterans). The term  α t is a vector of 9 indicator 
variables for each year considered, and  X jt is a vector set of 14 indicator variables 
corresponding to the possible values of year-of-birth, AFQT quintile, and race.17 We 
interact each of these 14 indicator variables with 9 year-specific indicator variables 
to account for differential levels of growth rates in DC enrollment by age, race, or 
17 The sample contains six possible values of YOB (1946 through 1951), two possible values of race (white and 
nonwhite), and six possible values of AFQT quintiles (we group those with a missing AFQT into a sixth category). 
Given there are 9 years of data used in these estimates, we are including 126 interactions. Because we apply OLS 
models to cell means and weight by the number of individual observations in each cell, the cell level estimates 
will be in most cases algebraically identical to those that we would obtain if cells were instead disaggregated to 
individual level rows. One exception to this dictum arises from the fact that 10 percent of cells have more than one 
AFQT quintile represented within the cell. We assign the cell to the AFQT quintile nearest to the cell’s mean AFQT 
quintile in these cases, meaning that the cell-level and corresponding individual level regressions will differ slightly. 
Table 2—DC Receipt and Diabetes Compensation among BOG  
and NOG Veterans, 1998–2006
Full sample Whites Nonwhites
BOG NOG BOG NOG BOG NOG
    (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)
panel A. percentage enrolled in DC
1998 13.5 6.3 13.0 6.0 17.1 9.0 
1999 13.9 6.4 13.4 6.1 17.7 9.2 
2000 14.3 6.5 13.8 6.2 18.2 9.3 
2001 15.0 6.6 14.4 6.3 19.3 9.4 
2002 16.4 6.8 15.8 6.4 21.4 9.7 
2003 18.3 7.0 17.6 6.6 24.0 10.0 
2004 19.9 7.2 19.1 6.8 26.0 10.3 
2005 21.4 7.4 20.6 7.0 28.2 10.6 
2006 23.0 7.6 22.1 7.2 30.2 10.9 
panel B. percentage receiving compensation for diabetes, conditional on DC enrollment
1998
1999 0.7 1.4 0.6 1.2 1.3 2.2 
2000 0.7 1.4 0.6 1.2 1.3 2.2 
2001 2.4 1.6 2.2 1.4 3.9 2.5 
2002 13.3 3.3 12.4 3.0 18.3 4.8 
2003 19.6 4.4 18.4 4.0 26.2 6.3 
2004 22.9 5.2 21.8 4.8 30.0 7.2 
2005 25.6 5.8 24.4 5.4 32.8 7.8 
2006   28.1 6.4   26.9 6.0   35.2 8.4 
notes: Panel A of this table reports the percentage of veterans in the BOG and NOG samples 
who were enrolled in the DC program between 1998 and 2006. Panel B reports the perce-
nage of DC enrolled veterans who received compensation for diabetes. The year 1998 is not 
included in panel B because our data include specific conditions for 1999 through 2006 only. 
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AFQT level during the 1998 through 2006 period. The coefficient  γ 0 corresponds 
to the (conditional) baseline DC enrollment gap between BOG and NOG veterans 
in the base year of 1998, while the coefficient vector  γ t estimates the difference in 
this gap in each subsequent year 1999 through 2006 relative to the enrollment gap 
in 1998. 
The statistically significant estimate of 6.97 for  γ 0 in the first column of panel A, 
Table 3 implies a 7 percentage point gap in DC enrollment between the BOG and 
NOG samples in the baseline year (1998) after controlling for race,  year-of-birth, and 
AFQT quintile, quite similar to the unconditional estimated difference of 7.2 per-
centage points in columns 1 and 2 of panel A, Table 2 (13.5 for BOG versus 6.3 
for NOG). The next eight rows of the first column in Table 3 display the estimates 
for  γ t in each year from 1999 through 2006. The statistically significant estimates 
Table 3—DC Receipt in the BOG versus NOG Samples from 1998–2006 Dependent Variable: 
Percentage of Cell Enrolled in DC
Panel A. 
All
  Panel B. YOB: 
1946–1948
  Panel C. YOB: 
1949–1951
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
BOG  6.97  6.91  7.12  7.06  6.83  6.77
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
BOG × (YR-1998)  0.40  0.40  0.40
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
BOG × (YR-2001) × (YR ≥ 2002)  0.99  1.04  0.93
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
BOG × (YR99)  0.33  0.34  0.32
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
BOG × (YR00)  0.59  0.58  0.61
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
BOG × (YR01)  1.18  1.18  1.18
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
BOG × (YR02)  2.46  2.55  2.37
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
BOG × (YR03)  4.08  4.22  3.92
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
BOG × (YR04)  5.39  5.58  5.18
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
BOG × (YR05)  6.71  6.93  6.45
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
BOG × (YR06)  7.98  8.28  7.65
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Outcome mean (1998) 10.36 10.75 9.94 
Outcome mean (2001) 11.31 11.76 10.84 
Outcome mean (2006) 16.25 17.14 15.29 
Observations (Cell) × (Year) 2,142,029   1,104,897   1,037,132 
notes: This table reports estimates of equations (1) and (2) where the dependent variable is the percentage of 
each cell enrolled in the Disability Compensation program each year. Panel A includes all veterans in our sample 
and other panels restrict the sample to veterans in the specified group. Each cell has one observation for each year 
between 1998 and 2006. (YR-1998) and (YR-2001) are linear time trends. All regressions include year fixed effects 
and fixed effects for each combination of (AFQT-quintile) × (year), (year of birth) × (year), and (race) × (year), 
where race is defined as white or nonwhite and veterans with a missing AFQT score are grouped into a sixth AFQT 
category. All regressions weight each observation according to the number of veterans in the cell. Standard errors, 
clustered on cell, are reported in parentheses. 
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of 0.33 and 0.59 for  γ 1999 and  γ 2000 imply that DC enrollment was increasing more 
rapidly (by 0.3 percentage points annually) for the BOG than NOG sample prior to 
the 2001 policy change. Beginning in 2001, these coefficients increase much more 
rapidly, by about 1.4 percentage points per year, and reach a cumulative differential 
of 7.98 percentage points by September of 2006. As shown in panels B and C of 
Table 3, the point estimates differ only modestly by birth cohort (1946–1948 and 
1949–1951), with slightly larger effects for the older than the younger group (8.28 
and 7.65 percentage points, respectively).
The sharp break in trend for DC enrollment among BOG relative to NOG vet-
erans motivates a parameterized version of equation (1) found in even-numbered 
columns of Table 3. For this specification, we replace the full set of year-by-BOG 
interactions with two linear time trends: a pre-2001 trend and a post-2001 trend 
change, estimated relative to the pre-2001 trend:
(2)  y jt  =  α t +  γ 0 × BO G j +  δ 0 × BO G j ×  (t − 1998) +  δ 1 × BO G j 
 ×  (t − 2001) × 1 [t ≥ 2002] +  X jt ′ β t +  ε jt .
This equation consistently estimates the causal effect of the Agent Orange policy 
change on DC enrollment under the assumption that the preexisting trend in the 
difference in DC enrollment between the BOG and NOG samples would have con-
tinued after 2001. In this equation,  δ 0 captures the preexisting trend in BOG relative 
to NOG DC participation just prior to the policy change, while  δ 1 estimates any 
additional change in the BOG relative to the NOG trend following the policy. We 
define 2002 to be the first post-policy year since the policy change took place in July 
2001 and DC participation data are from September of each year.
Estimates of equation (2) in the even-numbered columns of Table 3 highlight 
the significant trend increase in DC enrollment among BOG relative to NOG veter-
ans following the 2001 policy change. Because we treat 2001 as a pure pre-policy 
year, the estimate of  δ 0 in each case is slightly larger and the estimate of  δ 1 slightly 
smaller than is suggested by the year-by-year estimates. The magnitude of the trend 
break is similar between the two birth cohort groups (1946–1948 and 1949–1951). 
In panel A of Table 4, we split the sample by race (white/nonwhite) and by AFQT 
score. The acceleration in DC enrollment is largest among BOG veterans who are 
nonwhite and who have relatively low (below the fortieth percentile in the sample) 
AFQT scores.
In addition to showing a sharp acceleration in BOG DC enrollment following 
the 2001 Agent Orange policy, Figure 2 also reveals that, after 2001, there was only 
a modest increase in the fraction of BOG veterans receiving DC benefits absent 
a  diabetes award. Thus, the rapid growth in DC enrollment among BOG veterans 
appears substantially accounted for by an influx of new diabetes awards. Figure 3 
further relates these enrollment trends to the Agent Orange policy, showing a steep 
increase in the likelihood that BOG but not NOG veterans receive compensation 
for diabetes, both in the year of current DC receipt and in the year of initial DC 
enrollment. As documented in panel B of Table 2, the fraction of DC beneficiaries 
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 receiving compensation for diabetes among BOG veterans rose from 2.4 to 28.1 per-
cent (25.7 points) between 2001 and 2006 versus 1.6 to 6.4 percent among NOG 
veterans (4.8 points).18 Figure 4 underscores that the increase in DC enrollment was 
18 One reason that DC receipt for diabetes may also have increased (slightly) in the NOG sample is that our data 
only imperfectly classify BOG and NOG veterans; some veterans categorized as NOG may in fact have served in 
theater. In addition, administration of DC benefits appears to be somewhat discretionary. Even prior to the Agent 
Table 4—Disability Compensation Outcomes in the BOG versus NOG Samples from 1998–2006
All Nonwhites Whites AFQT < 45 AFQT ≥ 45
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
panel A. Dependent variable: percentage of cell enrolled in DC
BOG  6.91  7.72  6.80  8.33  5.93
(0.06) (0.19) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08)
BOG × (YR-1998)  0.40  0.61  0.37  0.52  0.31
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
BOG × (YR-2001) × (YR ≥ 2002)  0.99  1.27  0.95  1.19  0.81
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Outcome mean (1998) 10.36 13.44 9.96 11.55 8.98
panel B. Dependent variable: percentage of cell with CDr of 40 or higher
BOG  3.05  3.51  2.99  4.10  2.63
(0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05)
BOG × (YR-1998)  0.39  0.58  0.36  0.53  0.29
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
BOG × (YR-2001) × (YR ≥ 2002)  0.78  1.12  0.74  0.96  0.61
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Outcome mean (1998) 3.99 5.29 3.83 4.87 3.13 
panel C. Dependent variable: percentage of cell with iU status
BOG  0.27  0.35  0.26  0.41  0.24
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
BOG × (YR-1999)  0.16  0.20  0.16  0.25  0.12
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
BOG × (YR-2001) × (YR ≥ 2002)  0.20  0.27  0.19  0.23  0.15
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Outcome mean (1999) 0.55 0.70 0.53 0.71 0.42 
panel D. Dependent variable: cell mean annual DC payment
BOG  779  945  756  1,089  684
(10) (33) (10) (19) (13)
BOG × (YR-1998)  115  161  109  161  86
(2) (7) (2) (4) (3)
BOG × (YR-2001) × (YR ≥ 2002)  195  295  182  243  147
(3) (11) (3) (6) (4)
Outcome mean (1998) 1,093 1,449 1,048 1,344 865
Observations (Cell) × (Year) 2,142,029 232,540 1,909,489 660,866 988,801 
notes: This table reports estimates of equation (2) where the dependent variable is indicated in each panel heading.
Panel C excludes observations from 1998 since we do not observe IU status in that year. Annual DC payments are 
in 2014 dollars. (YR-1998), (YR-1999), and (YR-2001) are linear time trends. All regressions include year fixed 
effects and fixed effects for each combination of (AFQT-quintile) × (year), (year of birth) × (year), and (race) × 
(year). Column 1 includes all veterans in our sample and columns 2–5 restrict the sample to veterans in the spec-
ified group. Columns 1–3 group veterans with a missing AFQT score into a sixth AFQT category, while columns 
4–5 exclude veterans with missing AFQT scores. All regressions weight each observation according to the number 
of veterans in the cell. Standard errors, clustered on cell, are reported in parentheses.
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similarly rapid among older (YOB 1946–1948) and younger (YOB 1949–1951) 
Vietnam veterans in our sample, as is also shown in panels B and C of Table 3.
While our estimates so far capture the extensive margin (i.e., participation) impact 
of the Agent Orange policy, panels B through D of Table 4 consider outcomes that 
combine extensive (participation) and intensive (rated severity) margins. Prior to 
the policy change, the percentage of BOG relative to NOG veterans with Combined 
Disability Ratings of 40 or higher rose by 0.39 percentage points annually; panel B 
shows that this differential rose to 1.17 percentage points annually (0.39 + 0.78) 
after 2001. Panel C reveals a similar pattern for the percentage of veterans with an 
IU designation.19 Similarly, panel D indicates that the year-over-year increase in 
annual mean DC benefits paid to BOG relative to NOG veterans rose from $115 
prior to the policy change to $310 per year after 2001 ($115 + $195). Consistent 
with the estimates for DC enrollment by race and AFQT score, the estimates indi-
cate that CDRs and benefits payments increased more rapidly among nonwhite than 
white BOG veterans, and more rapidly among low-AFQT than high-AFQT BOG 
veterans.
Orange decision in 2000, 1.4 percent of BOG and 0.7 percent of NOG DC recipients were receiving compensation 
for service-connected diabetes (panel B of Table 2). Finally, some NOG veterans may have served in Korea in 1968 
or 1969, which would also entitle them to DC benefits for type 2 diabetes. These sources of slippage do not invali-
date our identification strategy provided that the post-2001 trend break in DC receipt in BOG versus NOG veterans 
is induced by the Agent Orange Policy change, which seems likely. 
19 Estimates of equation (2), where the outcome is the percentage of the cell receiving a CDR of 100 without IU 
status (not reported), are nearly identical to results reported in panel C of Table 4 for IU status, suggesting that the 
Agent Orange policy spurned a comparable rise in both IU designations and CDRs of 100. 
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Figure 3. Prevalence of DC Benefits for Diabetes in the BOG and NOG Samples
notes: This figure reports the annual percentage of BOG and NOG veterans who were enrolled in DC and who 
received DC benefits for diabetes. BOG, diabetes benefits during year of DC enrollment refers to the percentage of 
veterans in the BOG sample who were enrolled in DC, received benefits for diabetes, and began receiving diabetes 
benefits the same year they enrolled in DC.
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B. Enrollment in Other Federal Disability programs
Workers applying for SSDI benefits are unlikely to qualify for an award if they 
participate gainfully in the labor force while their case is being decided (Autor et al. 
2015). Knowledge of this fact may deter workers with residual work capacity from 
applying for SSDI since they would have to forfeit potential earnings in pursuit of an 
uncertain benefit. Since, as we document below, many veterans did leave the labor 
force after becoming eligible for DC benefits, it is plausible that a subset that would 
otherwise have been deterred from seeking SSDI benefits would choose to pursue 
these benefits as an indirect consequence of the Agent Orange policy.20
To examine these potential spillovers, we estimate models analogous to equation 
(2) where the outcome variable is the probability of SSDI receipt among BOG and 
NOG veterans (again measured at the level of SSA reporting cells). Reflecting the 
longer sample window available for the SSA outcomes, these models include two 
additional “pre” years, 1996 and 1997, and one additional “post” year, 2007. Panel A 
of Table 5 shows that, like DC enrollment, SSDI receipt was trending upward faster 
among BOG than NOG veterans by 0.13 percentage points per year prior to the 
2001 policy change. But this trend accelerated after 2001, increasing to 0.25 per-
centage points (0.13 + 0.12) annually. Notably, the estimated effect on SSDI is only 
20 Borghans, Gielen, and Luttmer (2014) find related evidence of program spillovers in disability receipt. On 
average, Dutch DI recipients offset a €1.00 loss in DI benefits with a €0.30 increase in other social support pro-
grams. Duggan, Singleton, and Song (2007) find evidence that reductions in Social Security retirement benefits 
stemming from the rising US full retirement age have lead to an increase in SSDI enrollment among cohorts facing 
a higher full retirement age. 
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Figure 4. Evolution of DC Receipt among BOG Relative to NOG Veterans, 1998–2006:  
Birth Cohorts 1946–1948 and 1949–1951
notes: This figure reports annual percentage point differences and 95 percent confidence intervals between BOG 
DC receipt and NOG DC receipt for two veteran birth cohorts: 1946–1948 and 1949–1951. The vertical line indi-
cates the year of the Agent Orange policy change. Each series is normalized to the BOG-NOG difference in DC 
receipt as of year 1998.
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about 12 percent as large as the corresponding estimate for DC enrollment (compare 
column 1, panel A of Tables 4 and 5).21 These results suggest that the Agent Orange 
policy spurred additional SSDI enrollment, which may in turn have magnified any 
reduction in labor force participation among eligible veterans.
The second panel of Table 5 reports analogous regressions for receipt of SSI. 
Here, the estimates point in the opposite direction: SSI enrollment was growing 
21 In estimates not displayed, we find similar impacts on SSDI receipt among the 1946–1948 and 1949–1951 
cohorts. 
Table 5—SSDI, SSI, and Total Disability Income in the BOG versus NOG Samples
All Nonwhites Whites AFQT < 45 AFQT ≥ 45
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
panel A. Dependent variable: percentage of cell receiving SSDi
BOG 0.74 1.14 0.69 1.12 0.81
(0.04) (0.15) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05)
BOG × (YR-1996) 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.14 0.11
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
BOG × (YR-2001) × (YR ≥ 2002) 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.10
(0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Outcome mean (1996) 4.51 6.69 4.23 6.77 3.08 
Observations (Cell) × (Year) 2,862,513 310,987 2,551,526 883,832 1,321,309 
panel B. Dependent variable: percentage of cell receiving SSi
BOG −0.238 −0.353 −0.222 −0.328 −0.063 
(0.017) (0.078) (0.016) (0.039) (0.018)
BOG × (YR-1996) −0.025 −0.024 −0.025 −0.038 −0.015 
(0.004) (0.016) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004)
BOG × (YR-2001) × (YR ≥ 2002) −0.013 −0.052 −0.008 −0.036 −0.004 
(0.006) (0.026) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006)
Outcome mean (1996) 0.904 2.263 0.730 1.538 0.503 
Observations (Cell) × (Year) 2,862,513 310,987 2,551,526 883,832 1,321,309 
panel C. Dependent variable: annual disability income (DC + SSDi + SSi), 1998–2006
BOG 874 1,076 847 1,214 782
(12) (41) (13) (24) (16)
BOG × (YR-1998) 130 180 123 174 100
(3) (10) (3) (6) (4)
BOG × (YR-2001) × (YR ≥ 2002) 229 330 217 281 176
(4) (14) (4) (8) (5)
Outcome mean (1998) 1,626 2,205 1,552 2,115 1,239 
Total income mean (1998) 54,500 38,885 56,494 40,178 60,625 
Observations (Cell) × (Year) 2,142,029 232,540 1,909,489 660,866 988,801 
notes: This table reports estimates of equation (2) where the dependent variable is the outcome indicated in the 
panel heading. For panels A and B, each cell has one observation for each year between 1996 and 2007. For panel C, 
each cell has one observation for each year between 1998 and 2006. (YR-1996), (YR-1998), and (YR-2001) are lin-
ear time trends. All regressions include year fixed effects and fixed effects for each combination of (AFQT-quintile) 
× (year), (year of birth) × (year), and (race) × (year), where race is defined as white or nonwhite. Column 1 
includes all veterans in our sample; all other columns restrict the sample to veterans in the specified group. Columns 
1–3 group veterans with a missing AFQT score into a sixth AFQT category while columns 4–5 exclude veterans 
with missing AFQT scores. In panel C, mean annual disability payments are in 2014 dollars. All regressions weight 
each observation according to the number of veterans in the cell. Standard errors, clustered on cell, are reported in 
parentheses. 
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more rapidly among NOG than among BOG veterans prior to 2001, and this trend 
accelerated after 2001, in all likelihood because the additional DC transfer income 
made some BOG veterans ineligible for means-tested SSI benefits. The magnitude 
of the estimated break in trend for SSI is only one-tenth as large as the correspond-
ing estimate for SSDI, however.
The final panel of Table 5 estimates equation (2) for disability income combining 
benefits payments from all three federal disability programs: DC, SSDI, and SSI. 
These estimates only include data from 1998 through 2006 since we do not have 
DC data for 1996, 1997, and 2007. Inclusion of SSDI and SSI benefits with DC 
benefits raises the differential trend increase in benefits payments for BOG rela-
tive to NOG veterans by approximately an additional 15 to 20 percent (compare 
to panel D of Table 4). Across all veterans in our sample, combined disability ben-
efits were rising by $130 annually among BOG relative to NOG veterans prior to 
the 2001 Agent Orange policy change. Commencing in 2002, this differential trend 
rose to $359 ($130 + $229). This average masks considerable heterogeneity. For 
veterans with high CDRs, DC benefits payments (which are not subject to federal 
taxation, as noted above) substantially exceed SSDI benefits for all but the highest 
( pre-disability) earners. Thus, the bulk of the impact of the Agent Orange policy on 
veterans’ net transfer income accrues through the DC program.
V. Consequences for Labor Force Participation
We now consider impacts of the Agent Orange policy on veterans’ employ-
ment and earnings. Applying equations (1) and (2) to labor market outcomes, we 
test whether the employment rates and earnings of BOG relative to NOG veter-
ans declined differentially following the 2001 policy change. We again include 
data from 1996, 1997, and 2007 because of the longer sample window available for 
SSA outcomes.
A. impacts on Labor Force participation
Table 6 considers the impact of the Agent Orange policy on the percentage of 
living veterans in an SSA reporting cell who have positive labor earnings (also sum-
marized in online Reference Figure 1), which we refer to as labor force participation 
(LFP) for brevity. The first column finds that LFP was slightly lower among BOG 
than NOG veterans in the baseline year of 1996: by 0.32 percentage points on a base 
of approximately 86 percent. This LFP gap was modestly expanding (i.e., becom-
ing more negative) in the early part of our sample period, falling by an additional 
0.81 points between 1996 and 2001. The expansion accelerated after 2001, however, 
with BOG relative to NOG LFP falling by an additional 2.02 percentage points 
between 2001 and 2007. Column 2 of Table 6, which fits the parameterized model 
in equation (2), shows the rate of LFP divergence between BOG and NOG veterans 
roughly doubled after the Agent Orange decision, from 0.15 percentage points per 
year to 0.33 percentage points (0.15 + 0.18) annually after 2001.
Coupled with the evidence in Table 3 on DC enrollments, the Table 6 estimates 
suggest that the differential increase in DC enrollment among BOG  veterans 
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spurred a reduction in their labor supply. A natural alternative interpretation, 
however, is that BOG veterans were in worse health than NOG veterans—per-
haps due to the rigors of in-theater military service—leading to comparatively 
earlier retirements in the 2000s for reasons unrelated to the 2001 policy change. 
If so, the accelerating decline in LFP among BOG veterans after 2001 should 
primarily impact the oldest Vietnam veterans, with younger veteran cohorts exhib-
iting a similar LFP falloff as they approached these early retirement years in sub-
sequent years.
Table 6—Labor Force Participation in the BOG versus NOG Samples from 1996−2007  
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Cell with Positive Annual Earnings
Panel A.  
All
Panel B. YOB: 
1946−1948
Panel C. YOB: 
1949−1951
  (1) (2)   (1) (2)   (1) (2)
BOG −0.32 −0.33  0.00  0.02 −0.82 −0.87 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
BOG × (YR-1996) −0.15  −0.17 −0.14 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
BOG × (YR-2001) × (YR ≥ 2002) −0.18  −0.19 −0.18
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
BOG × (YR97) −0.16 −0.15 −0.16 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
BOG × (YR98) −0.31 −0.29 −0.33 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
BOG × (YR99) −0.45 −0.38 −0.52 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
BOG × (YR00) −0.77 −0.79 −0.75 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.09)
BOG × (YR01) −0.81 −0.87 −0.76 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
BOG × (YR02) −1.01 −1.06 −0.96 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10)
BOG × (YR03) −1.34 −1.45 −1.23 
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10)
BOG × (YR04) −1.74 −1.92 −1.55 
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11)
BOG × (YR05) −2.15 −2.27 −2.03 
(0.08) (0.11) (0.11)
BOG × (YR06) −2.43 −2.56 −2.29 
(0.08) (0.11) (0.12)
BOG × (YR07) −2.83 −2.93 −2.73 
(0.09) (0.12) (0.12)
Outcome mean (1996) 85.70 86.56 84.80 
Observations (Cell) × (Year) 2,862,513   1,476,423   1,386,090 
notes: This table reports estimates of equations (1) and (2) where the dependent variable is the percentage of each 
cell with positive annual earnings. Panel A includes all veterans in our sample, and panels B and C restrict the sam-
ple to veterans in the specified group. (YR-1996) and (YR-2001) are linear time trends. All regressions include 
year fixed effects and fixed effects for each combination of (AFQT-quintile) × (year), (year of birth) × (year), and 
(race) × (year), where race is defined as white or nonwhite and veterans with a missing AFQT score are grouped 
into a sixth AFQT category. All regressions weight each observation according to the number of veterans in the cell. 
Standard errors, clustered on cell, are reported in parentheses.
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Figure 5 and the remaining 2 panels of Table 6 explore these competing hypoth-
eses by again subdividing the sample into 2 birth cohorts of average ages 54 and 
51 years at the time of the policy change. Both the figure and the table reveal that 
labor force participation of BOG relative to NOG veterans for both sets of birth 
cohorts dropped sharply soon after the policy change. The year-over-year decline in 
BOG relative to NOG participation doubled after 2001 for both older (1946–1948) 
and younger (1949–1951) birth cohorts, rising from 0.17 to 0.36 percentage points 
(0.17 + 0.19) among the former group, and from 0.14 to 0.32 percentage points 
(0.14 + 0.18) among the latter group. This trend break in BOG relative to NOG 
labor force participation, occurring simultaneously across birth cohorts after 2001, 
suggests that benefits expansion rather than early retirements explains the sharp drop 
in BOG labor force participation following the Agent Orange decision. Notably, we 
do not observe any differential increase in mortality among BOG relative to NOG 
veterans in the years immediately following 2001, which further weighs against the 
possibility that the differential decline in BOG labor force participation after the 
policy change was due to a more rapid deterioration in health (see online Reference 
Tables 4 and 5).
The upper panel of Table 7 explores changes in LFP by race and AFQT subgroup. 
These results generally mirror uptake of DC across demographic groups. Consistent 
with the Table 4 findings for DC enrollment, the post-2001 fall in LFP among non-
white and among low-AFQT BOG relative to NOG veterans is more pronounced 
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Figure 5. Evolution of Labor Force Participation among BOG Relative to NOG Veterans, 1996–2007: 
Birth Cohorts 1946–1948 and 1949–1951
notes: This figure reports annual percentage point differences and 95 percent confidence intervals between BOG 
labor force participation (LFP) and NOG LFP for two veteran birth cohorts: 1946–1948 and 1949–1951. Each 
series is normalized to the BOG-NOG difference in LFP as of year 1996. The vertical line indicates the year of the 
Agent Orange policy change. Labor force participation is defined as the share of veterans in a cell with positive 
earnings.
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than among white and higher AFQT veterans, though these differences are not sta-
tistically significant.
B. impacts on Labor market Earnings
Alongside reducing LFP, receipt of DC benefits may spur veterans to reduce their 
work hours or switch from full-time to part-time employment, thus lowering annual 
 earnings among those remaining in the labor force. We explore the effect of the 
Agent Orange policy on labor force earnings by estimating equation (2) for the log 
Table 7—LFP and Earnings in the BOG versus NOG Samples from 1996−2007
All Nonwhites Whites AFQT < 45 AFQT ≥ 45
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
panel A. Dependent variable: percentage of cell with earnings > 0
BOG −0.33  −2.50  −0.05  −0.88  −0.92 
(0.07) (0.24) (0.07) (0.13) (0.09)
BOG × (YR-1996)  −0.15  −0.19  −0.15  −0.16  −0.11 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
BOG × (YR-2001) × (YR ≥ 2002)  −0.18  −0.22  −0.18  −0.20  −0.15 
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Outcome mean (1996) 85.70 78.18 86.67 81.70 89.08 
Observations (Cell) × (Year) 2,862,513 310,987 2,551,526 883,832 1,321,309 
panel B. Dependent variable: 100 × ln(cell mean earnings)
BOG  −2.59  −4.68  −2.30  0.02  −4.10 
(0.23) (0.77) (0.24) (0.41) (0.29)
BOG × (YR-1996)  −0.23  −0.33  −0.21  −0.27  −0.13 
(0.04) (0.13) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
BOG × (YR-2001) × (YR ≥ 2002)  −0.45  −0.77  −0.41  −0.40  −0.27 
(0.06) (0.22) (0.06) (0.12) (0.08)
Outcome mean (1996) 1,067.44 1,033.86 1,071.73 1,039.92 1,082.06
Earnings mean (1996) 50,658 36,025 52,530 37,252 56,614 
Observations (Cell) × (Year) 2,855,305 308,923 2,546,382 879,962 1,320,155 
panel C. Dependent variable: 100 × ln(percentage of cell with earnings > 0)
BOG  −0.29  −3.57  0.13  −1.20  −1.14 
(0.10) (0.36) (0.10) (0.20) (0.12)
BOG × (YR-1996)  −0.21  −0.31  −0.20  −0.24  −0.16 
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
BOG × (YR-2001) × (YR ≥ 2002)  −0.36  −0.52  −0.35  −0.44  −0.29 
(0.03) (0.12) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04)
Outcome mean (1996) −17.85 −28.26 −16.51 −23.28 −13.25
Observations (Cell) × (Year) 2,855,305 308,923 2,546,382 879,962 1,320,155 
notes: This table reports estimates of equation (2) where the dependent variable is the outcome indicated in each 
panel heading. Each cell has one observation for each year between 1996 and 2007. Panels B and C exclude cells 
with 0 mean annual earnings. All earnings outcomes are in 2014 dollars. (YR-1996) and (YR-2001) are linear 
time trends. All regressions include year fixed effects and fixed effects for each combination of (AFQT-quintile) × 
(year), (year of birth) × (year), and (race) × (year), where race is defined as white or nonwhite. Column 1 includes 
all veterans in our sample and columns 2−5 restrict the sample to veterans in the specified group. Columns 1−3 
group veterans with a missing AFQT score into a sixth AFQT category, while columns 4−5 exclude veterans with 
missing AFQT scores. All regressions weight each observation according to the number of veterans in the cell. 
Standard errors, clustered on cell, are reported in parentheses.
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of cell mean earnings, excluding (of necessity) cells where all veterans have exited 
the labor force.22 Panel B of Table 7 shows that earnings were about 2.6 log points 
lower on average among BOG than NOG veterans in our baseline year, and this gap 
was expanding by about 0.2 log points per year through 2001. The panel B estimates 
indicate that the earnings gap grew significantly more rapidly—by about 0.7 log 
points annually (0.23 + 0.45)—following the 2001 policy change, a pattern that is 
also visible in Appendix Figure 1. Once again, the effects are larger for nonwhite 
and low-AFQT veterans.
Since these total earnings impacts combine extensive margin (participation) and 
intensive margin (hours and wage) responses, we cannot directly infer whether they 
reflect changes in earnings among incumbents or merely a reduction in the number 
of veterans working. The evidence in panel A of Table 7 suggests, however, that 
minority and low-AFQT veterans were particularly likely to exit the labor force upon 
receiving DC benefits. If we hypothesize more generally that veterans with lower 
potential earnings are most likely to exit the labor force in response to increased 
transfer income, we can compare extensive margin and total earnings responses to 
assess evidence for intensive margin responses. Concretely, suppose that earnings 
among those dropping out of the labor force are below the average of those still 
working within the cell—that is, income effects are larger for low earnings workers. 
In this case, the decline in log cell earnings will be smaller than the decline in log 
cell labor force participation. Conversely, if the decline in log cell earnings exceeds 
the decline in log cell participation, this indicates that either earnings are also falling 
on the intensive margin or, contrary to our assumption, higher earning workers are 
disproportionately exiting employment.
To facilitate earnings and employment comparisons, panel C of Table 7 reports 
estimates where the dependent variable is the log of the fraction of veterans in a cell 
working (rather than simply the percentage working, as in panel A). Comparing 
across panels B and C reveals that the decline in relative earnings of BOG versus 
NOG veterans after 2001 is, in most cases, slightly larger than the relative decline 
in labor force participation. In column 1, for example, the relative decline in log 
earnings of BOG relative to NOG veterans expands by 0.45 log points per year after 
2001 (panel B) whereas the relative decline in log LFP increases by only 0.36 log 
points per year (panel C). This pattern also holds for black and white veterans con-
sidered separately, though it does not hold for lower and higher AFQT veterans. We 
infer that the Agent Orange policy likely induced a mixture of labor force exit and 
earnings reductions among beneficiaries, though the evidence on the latter margin 
is not clear cut.23
22 We use the log of the mean rather than the mean of the log because of the cell-level aggregation of our earn-
ings data. We do not, however, adjust cell means for nonparticipation; if a cell contains 5 veterans each earning 
$25,000 annually and one leaves the labor force, mean cell earnings falls to $20,000. Thus, this measure incorpo-
rates intensive and extensive margin adjustments. 
23 For completeness, Appendix Table 4 also presents a set of comparison specifications using mean and median 
cell earnings in place of the log of mean cell earnings used above. Substantial variance in annual earnings measured 
in levels makes point estimates too imprecise to draw any strong inferences. To reduce the influence of outliers, 
panel B uses a trimmed sample that excludes all cells that have mean annual earnings in any year that exceeds the 
ninety-fifth percentile of cell earnings in the respective year. As a further check on the influence of outliers, panel C 
uses cell median earnings as the outcome variable. For both trimmed mean and median earnings, we find a signifi-
cant increase in the trend earnings divergence between BOG and NOG veterans after 2001. 
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To what degree is this causal effect driven by changes in labor force participation 
among incumbent DC recipients—many of whom received higher combined dis-
ability ratings and corresponding benefit increases as a consequence of the Agent 
Orange policy—rather than by changes in participation among new enrollees? 
Appendix Table 5 probes this question by comparing the evolution of CDRs among 
veterans according to DC enrollment status as of 1998. Among veterans enrolled in 
DC by 1998 (incumbents), we find that the growth in CDRs for BOG incumbents 
was substantially larger than the growth for NOG incumbents prior to the policy 
change, a trend that increased only modestly after 2001. In contrast, the acceleration 
among new BOG entrants after 2001 was much larger than the acceleration observed 
among BOG incumbents relative to their NOG counterparts. This pattern suggests 
that labor supply impacts are also likely to be driven primarily by new DC entrants.
Panel B of Appendix Table 5 complements this evidence by comparing labor 
force participation trends between cells with a high density of DC incumbents and 
those with a low density of DC incumbents.24 Following the 2001 policy change, 
the rate of divergence among BOG relative to NOG veterans actually attenuated 
slightly for cells with a high initial density of incumbents, but nearly tripled for 
cells with a low initial density of incumbents. This pattern again suggests that the 
differential decline in labor force participation among BOG relative to NOG vet-
erans after 2001 was driven primarily by veterans induced to enroll in DC by the 
Agent Orange policy rather than by policy-induced changes in behavior among 
incumbent recipients.
VI. Comparing Labor Supply and Enrollment Impacts:  
Instrumental Variable Estimates
Motivated by the evidence that the Agent Orange policy both raised DC enroll-
ment and lowered earnings among eligible veterans, we now use the Agent Orange 
policy as an instrumental variable for receipt of DC benefits. This provides a valid 
approach for estimating the causal effect of DC benefits on labor supply under the 
assumption that the Agent Orange policy only affects employment and earnings 
through its impact on benefits enrollment and transfer payments. While untestable, 
the panoply of findings above confers credibility that our approach is in step with 
the exclusion restriction. We find a sharp rise in DC receipt, DC payments, and 
total disability income among BOG relative to NOG veterans following adoption of 
the Agent Orange policy. Moreover, the rise in take-up was equally steep and pro-
nounced among younger and older veterans, and was greatest among nonwhite and 
low-AFQT veterans. In all cases, take-up responses are paralleled by differential 
employment and earnings drops among BOG relative to NOG veterans that occur 
among both older and younger veterans, and which are slightly more pronounced 
among nonwhite and low-AFQT vets.
Table 8 presents instrumental variables estimates of equation (2) for the impact 
of DC participation on labor force participation, where the endogenous variable in 
24 Because labor force participation rates are measured at the cell level and cells are not stratified on DC enroll-
ment, we cannot fully distinguish labor force participation effects among DC incumbents versus DC entrants. 
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panel A is the percentage of a cell enrolled in DC.25 The 2SLS estimate in column 1 
finds that each percentage point increase in DC enrollment reduces the fraction of 
veterans working by 0.18 points—that is, approximately one veteran exits the labor 
force for every five veterans newly awarded DC benefits. Comparing across rows of 
this table, we find slightly larger employment effects for nonwhite and low-AFQT 
veterans, consistent with our maintained hypothesis that participation among these 
groups is more elastic.
25 We limit the sample to the years 1998 through 2006 for which DC measures are available, rather than the 
longer sample window of 1996 through 2007 for which SSA earnings data are available. The instrumental variable 
for DC enrollment is  BO G j ×  (t − 2001) × 1 [t ≥ 2002] . 
Table 8—2SLS Estimates of DC Receipt and Annual Disability Benefits on LFP and Earnings
All Nonwhites Whites AFQT < 45 AFQT ≥ 45
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
panel A. DV: percentage of cell with positive earnings, endogenous variable: percentage of cell enrolled in DC 
DC enrollment  −0.18  −0.25  −0.17  −0.20  −0.17 
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Outcome mean (1998) 84.7 77.1 85.7 80.5 88.3
Observations (Cell) × (Year) 2,142,029 232,540 1,909,489 660,866 988,801
panel B. DV: percentage of cell with positive earnings, endogenous variable: (disability benefits)/1,000
(Disability benefits)/1,000  −0.79  −0.96  −0.76  −0.83  −0.81 
(0.12) (0.27) (0.13) (0.18) (0.21)
Outcome mean (2001) 81.9 73.4 83.0 77.1 85.9 
Earnings mean (2001) 50,994 35,080 53,018 36,313 57,506
Observations (Cell) × (Year) 2,142,029 232,540 1,909,489 660,866 988,801 
panel C. DV: 100 × ln(earnings + disability income), endogenous variable: percentage of cell enrolled in DC
DC enrollment  0.52  0.83  0.47  0.73  0.42
(0.06) (0.15) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10)
Outcome mean (1998) 1,076 1,045 1,080 1,050 1,089
Earnings mean (1998) 52,875 36,680 54,943 38,063 59,386
Observations (Cell) × (Year) 2,137,665 231,235 1,906,430 658,480 988,152
panel D. DV: Cell mean earnings, endogenous variable: disability benefits [trimmed sample]
Disability benefits  −0.26  −0.13  −0.29  −0.21  −0.18 
(0.09) (0.17) (0.11) (0.11) (0.19)
Outcome mean (1998) 44,729 35,395 46,044 36,962 50,371
Observations (Cell) × (Year) 1,923,250 228,311 1,694,939 649,531 856,757
notes: Panels A and B of this table report 2SLS estimates of the effects of DC receipt on labor force participation 
(panel A) and annual disability benefits on labor force participation (panel B). Panel C reports 2SLS estimates of 
the effects of DC receipt on 100 times the natural log of each cell’s mean annual earnings plus disability income 
from DC, SSDI, and SSI. Panel D reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of an additional dollar in disability income 
on earnings levels for the trimmed sample, which excludes any cell that ever has a mean annual earnings level that 
exceeds the ninety-fifth percentile of annual cell mean earnings in any year between 1996 and 2007. The instru-
ment for all estimates is a (BOG) × (year − 2001) × 1(year ≥ 2002) time trend. All regressions include a main 
effect for (BOG), a (BOG) × (year − 1998) time trend, year fixed effects, and fixed effects for each combination of 
(AFQT-quintile) × (year), (year of birth) × (year), and (race) × (year). Earnings and disability benefits are in 2014 
dollars. Each cell has one observation for each year between 1998 and 2006 and all regressions weight each obser-
vation according to the number of veterans in the cell. Standard errors, clustered on cell, are reported in parentheses.
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By specifying DC participation as the endogenous variable, panel A estimates 
do not account for policy-induced increases in DC benefits along the intensive mar-
gin—higher benefits among incumbents and greater potential benefits among new 
enrollees. We relax this restriction in panel B by making our endogenous variable 
the sum of disability income (DC, SSDI, and SSI benefits). This variable captures 
changes in transfer payments among both new enrollees and incumbents. Because 
many cells receive no disability payments in a given year, we specify the disability 
payment measure in real dollars rather than taking the logarithm.
The panel B estimates find that each thousand dollars in disability benefits 
payment reduces the probability of a veteran working by approximately 0.79 
percentage points, with slightly larger impacts among nonwhite veterans (0.96 
points). Scaling these estimates by the mean rate of labor force participation in 
2001 (81.9 points) and mean year 2001 earnings (in constant $2014 dollars) of 
$51.0K implies an elasticity of labor force participation with respect to total income 
of −0.49.26 This elasticity substantially exceeds those found in lottery studies 
(Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote 1999; Cesarini et al. 2015), though it is similar in 
magnitude to the findings of Boyle and Lahey (2010), who study the labor sup-
ply of a relatively comparable set of veterans who were nearing retirement in the 
mid-1990s.27
There are three likely reasons why our elasticity estimates exceed those for lottery 
winners. First, at the inception of the Agent Orange policy in 2001,  Vietnam-era vet-
erans were already near elderly (ages 50 to 55). Moreover, those veterans induced 
to enroll by the policy were likely to be in relatively poor health. Thus, we would 
expect their labor force participation to be relatively elastic as compared to a work-
ing age population. Second, distinct from lump sum cash payments, DC benefits 
are structured as an annuity—a stream of cash payment that, barring an unprece-
dented change in national policy, will persist (and generally rise) until mortality. 
This insurance component of DC (i.e., against the financial risk of unanticipated 
longevity) should generate a larger labor force participation response than a nom-
inally equivalent lump sum cash payment.28 Finally, we cannot rule out that the 
26 Specifically, the elasticity we calculate is an elasticity of labor force participation with respect to total income, 
 %ΔLFp __________  
%ΔTotal income , where the percent change in total income is calculated as the ratio of additional unearned 
income from disability benefits relative to mean labor income in 2001. A 0.79 percentage point drop in labor 
force participation roughly equals a 0.964 percent decrease in LFP relative to the mean LFP rate in 2001 
 ( − 0.79 ____81.9 × 100 = − 0.964) . Likewise, a $1,000 increase in disability income is akin to a 1.961 percent increase in 
total income, relative to mean annual earnings in 2001  ( 1,000 ____51,000 × 100 = 1.961) . Dividing −0.964 by 1.961 yields 
an elasticity of −0.49. 
27 Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote (1999), a working paper version of Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote (2001), 
reports income elasticities of participation ranging from 0 to −0.14. Table 4 of Cesarini et al. (2015) indicates that 
winning 1M in SEK reduces LFP by 2.07 percentage points. Scaling this estimate by a mean of 88.8 and mean 
earnings of 213 SEK (reported in Table A3.2) reveals an elasticity of −0.005  ( − 2.07 ____88.8 / 1,000,000 ______213,000 = − 0.005) . See 
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a broad review of labor supply elasticities and McClelland and Mok (2012) for 
more recent evidence. 
28 A nominally equivalent lump sum payment would correspond to the annual DC benefit amount multiplied by 
expected life years remaining, discounted to the present to account for the staggered payment structure. One can 
translate annuity values into conventional PDVs by applying assumptions on future mortality at the time of award. 
For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that veterans likely face substantial uncertainty about expected longevity 
and hence the annuity component of DC benefits offers economic value beyond the lump sum value. 
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 participation elasticity estimate incorporates both pure (non-incentive) income 
effects from increased transfer income and additional incentive effects stemming 
from the potential availability of IU and SSDI benefits.
Since the Agent Orange policy precipitated a rise in transfer payments and a 
decline in employment and earnings among eligible veterans, its net impact on 
incomes of BOG relative to NOG veterans is ambiguous. Panel C of Table 8 there-
fore reports estimates of the net impact of DC enrollment on total income, where 
DC enrollment is instrumented with the Agent Orange policy. The outcome  variable 
for these estimates is 100 times the log of cell total income—earnings plus disability 
benefits—and the endogenous variable is again the percentage of the cell enrolled 
in DC. The point estimate of 0.52 for the full sample implies that if, for example, 
a cell increased from 0 to 20 percent enrolled in DC, then average total income 
in the cell would increase by about 10.4 percent. These impacts are substantially 
larger for nonwhite and low-AFQT veterans, with point estimates of 0.83 and 0.73, 
respectively.29 In interpreting these sizable impacts, note that we found above that 
only 1 in 5 (18 percent) of newly enrolled veterans exited the labor force as a conse-
quence of the Agent Orange policy. For the remaining four-fifths, enrollment in DC 
raised transfer income while generating only minimal offsetting reductions in labor 
income, thus unambiguously raising total income.
To further characterize these labor supply impacts, we use the benefits variation 
generated by the policy change to estimate veterans’ marginal propensity to reduce 
earnings per dollar of non-labor income (MPE). Here, we use cell mean labor earn-
ings (in dollars) as the outcome variable and use total disability benefits (also in dol-
lars) as the endogenous variable, instrumented by the Agent Orange policy change. 
To reduce the influence of outliers in these estimates, we use a trimmed sample 
that excludes all cells that have mean annual earnings in any year that exceeds the 
 ninety-fifth percentile of cell earnings in the respective year.30
Estimates in the bottom panel of Table 8 indicate an MPE of −0.26 overall. 
Estimates for subgroups are in all cases negative, though heterogeneous and rela-
tively imprecise. As with our labor force participation elasticity estimates above, the 
MPE estimates for Vietnam-era veterans substantially exceed those in the literature 
estimated using prime age lottery samples (for example, −0.12 in Imbens, Rubin, 
and Sacerdote 2001; and −0.11 in Cesarini et al. 2015). Though we cannot rule out 
that these large behavioral responses for veterans reflect the combined impact of 
income and incentive effects and the relatively advanced age and marginal health 
of the Vietnam-era veteran population, in combination with the annuity structure 
of the DC benefit program, it is plausible that much of the labor supply response is 
accounted for by income effects.
29 Recall that post policy-change increment to disability benefits for nonwhite and low-AFQT veterans exceeded 
by 50 to 60 percent those of white and high-AFQT veterans (Table 5 panel C), while earnings for nonwhite and 
low-AFQT veterans were substantially below those of white high-AFQT veterans (Table 7 panel B). Our data fur-
ther imply the Agent Orange policy resulted in substantially higher net income for low-AFQT BOG veterans than 
low-AFQT NOG veterans, consistent with the findings of Angrist, Chen, and Frandsen (2010) for low-education 
veterans. 
30 See the comparison of mean, trimmed mean, and median estimates found in Appendix Table 4 and discussed 
in footnote 23. 
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VII. Discussion
This paper provides evidence that the policy-induced increase in enrollment in 
the Veteran Administration’s Disability Compensation program had a significant 
effect on the labor supply of Vietnam-era veterans. In net, we estimate that 18 per-
cent of individuals who became eligible for the DC program as a result of the policy 
change dropped out of the labor force. This effect is roughly two-thirds as large 
as analogous estimates for the impact of SSDI receipt on labor force participation 
(Maestas, Mullen, and Strand 2013; French and Song 2014). Given that the DC 
program is intended to compensate veterans for their service-connected disabilities 
without affecting their incentives for labor force participation whereas the SSDI 
program provides strong non-work incentives, it is noteworthy that their impacts 
on labor force participation are relatively comparable. Combining policy-induced 
increases in transfer income and reductions in labor force participation and earnings, 
we estimate an income elasticity of labor force participation of −0.49 and a mar-
ginal propensity to reduce earnings per dollar of non-labor income of −0.26. These 
estimates are substantially larger than estimates from studies of lottery winners, 
though not implausible considering that, first, DC benefits are akin to an annuity 
policy rather than a lump sum transfer like lottery winnings, and because the Agent 
Orange policy change affected a  near-elderly population of Vietnam-era veterans in 
diminished health.
To provide a rough accounting of the economic and fiscal costs of this policy, 
we note that our estimates imply that the Agent Orange policy increased DC enroll-
ment by about 1 percentage point per year after 2001 among Vietnam veterans who 
served in-theater. If one assumes the same effect for other Vietnam veterans (e.g., 
those not in the Army or born outside of our 1946–1951 window), this would sug-
gest that by 2007 there were about 210,000 (0.06  × 3.5 million) additional induced 
DC recipients. Given an average annual benefit of about $14,000, this suggests a 
$3 billion increment to annual DC expenditures and—while the available data are 
limited—a corresponding increase of about $1 billion in VA health expenditures. 
Adding to this sum the loss in tax revenue from diminished veterans’ labor sup-
ply and the increase in their SSDI payments brings the annual total to $5 billion. 
Assuming, conservatively, that the labor supply effect of DC enrollment is entirely 
driven by (non-incentive) income effects—and is thus a transfer—there still remains 
the well-known efficiency cost of raising the public funds to offset these expendi-
tures. Applying a dead weight loss per dollar of tax revenue of 0.3, this efficiency 
cost is about $1.5 billion per year in the first 5 to 6 years after the policy change, and 
the effects appear to have continued beyond our sample window (Coile, Duggan, 
and Guo 2015).
While this calculation assumes DC payments have no distortionary incentive 
effects, it appears plausible that the pure income effect of DC benefits on  veterans’ 
employment and earnings is augmented by the interaction between DC enrollment 
and veterans’ potential eligibility for Individual Unemployability (IU) and SSDI ben-
efits, both of which provide strong incentives against gainful employment. Consistent 
with this hypothesis, we find that the Agent Orange decision increased enrollment 
in SSDI by approximately one recipient for every eight veterans newly enrolled in 
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DC. While 14 percent of DC beneficiaries in our sample had received IU status by 
2006, this share was 20 percent among BOG veterans who enrolled in DC in the year 
after the Agent Orange policy. Since IU benefits are only available to veterans with 
earnings at or below the poverty threshold for a single individual, the rapid growth 
of IU designations among newly enrolled DC beneficiaries underscores the potential 
for the graduated DC benefit program to generate unintended labor supply impacts.
Using estimates from Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2013), we benchmark the 
size of these incentive impacts. We assume that (i) the incentive effect of the DC 
program is restricted to veterans with IU status; and (ii) veterans who were induced 
to receive benefits at the 100 percent level are comparable to SSDI applicants. 
Panel C of Table 4 indicates that the policy change induced a 0.20 annual percent-
age point increase in BOG relative to NOG receipt of IU status, which accounts for 
roughly 20 percent of the overall increase in BOG relative to NOG DC receipt after 
2001. Multiplying 20 percent by 28 percentage points, the reduction in labor supply 
estimated by Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2013), suggests that roughly 31 percent 
of the decline in labor force participation following the policy change was the result 
of distortionary incentives (0.20 × 28 = 5.6, which is 31 percent of 18).
This back-of-the-envelope calculation for the incentive component of the observed 
behavioral response to provisions of DC benefits is potentially an  over-estimate 
because: SSDI reduces labor force participation through both income and incen-
tive effects; the income effect of the IU benefit, which typically results in higher 
monthly payments than SSDI benefits and does not terminate at age 65, is likely 
much stronger than the income effect of SSDI receipt; and the calculation ignores 
the possibility of income effects among DC beneficiaries who receive disability 
ratings of less than 100. Conversely, if some veterans reduce labor force partic-
ipation to seek higher disability ratings, our calculations will fail to account for 
this behavioral distortion. In short, our calculation is unlikely to capture all aspects 
of the DC program that alter incentives for employment and earnings. Analyzing 
the dynamic interaction between these incentive and non-incentive effects of the 
Veterans Disability Compensation program (as in Autor, Kostøl, and Mogstad 2015, 
for Norway’s Disability Insurance program) remains a goal for further research.
Data Appendix
A. Construction of Cells in the BOG and nOG Samples
To construct cells for matching individuals in the BOG and NOG samples with 
SSA data, we group individuals based on predetermined demographics  characteristics 
including sex, race, year of birth, and so forth. The list of variables used to form 
cells, ranked in the order in which the grouping occurred, is:
 1. Sex (male or female),
 2. Race (white or nonwhite),
 3. Death year (e.g., 1985),
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 4. Year-of-birth (e.g., 1946),
 5. Start year (e.g., 1966),
 6. Education at entry (e.g., 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 for hsd, hsg, smc, clg, clg-plus),
 7. AFQT score quintile (e.g., 2),
 8. Loss year (e.g., 1972),
 9. Region of residence (e.g., Northeast).
Before forming cells, we determined which individuals could be verified upon match-
ing to the SSA data. A match would be verified if the social security number, date of 
birth, and at least six letters of the last name could be matched in the two data sets. We 
construct cells from the verified BOG and NOG samples so that there are between five 
and nine individuals in each cell. Each cell consists only of BOG or NOG veterans. 
The number of variables used in the grouping varies across cells: in some cases, a cell 
reaches a size of five to nine after matching on a relatively small number of variables. 
If, after matching on a given variable in the above hierarchy, a cell obtains a size of 10 
to 29 individuals, we do not further subdivide using the next matching variable, but 
instead we split the cell into the maximum number of cells with size 5 or more. (We 
sort, however, on the next matching variable to maximize similarity within the cells.) 
If a cell has fewer than five individuals after matching, we then re-merge it with an 
adjacent cell. If a cell with fewer than five individuals is merged with an adjacent cell 
to form a new cell with more than nine individuals, the merged cell is split in two. 
The distribution of the cell size for the verified NOG sample is:
In cell of size Frequency Percentage
5 1,388,440 58.86 
6 657,696 27.88 
7 171,269 7.26 
8 70,048 2.97 
9 71,271 3.02 
Total 2,358,724 100.00 
The corresponding distribution for the verified BOG sample is:
In cell of size Frequency Percentage
5 942,415 65.19
6 328,338 22.71
7 92,785 6.42
8 41,120 2.84
9 40,878 2.83
Total 1,445,536 100.00
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The frequency distribution for the number of variables used in the BOG and NOG 
cell formation is as follows (thus 206,780 in the BOG matched on variables 1 
through and including 8):
Number of Vars Number in NOG Number in BOG
1 0 0
2 89 61
3 3,391 4,149
4 38,087 30,716
5 86,671 62,807
6 80,909 65,140
7 174,281 162,909
8 397,667 206,780
9 1,577,629 912,974
Total 2,358,724 1,445,536
B. Construction of the Analysis Sample
Online Reference Figure 2 diagrams the construction of the sample used in our 
analysis. The “loss year” file and the Vietnam file combine to form our baseline 
OEMA sample of 4.1 million veterans. After merging the OEMA sample to VA dis-
ability data, the SSA Death Master File, and SSA earnings information, we restrict 
our sample to 3.8 million veterans who had valid SSA earnings data. As reported 
in online Reference Table 1, the number of BOG veterans in our database is largest 
in the 1966 through 1971 start years; veterans who began their service after 1971 
tended not to serve in the Vietnam theater. Those entering before 1966 are much less 
likely to be included in our sample since many had exited the Army prior to 1968, 
the first year of our “loss year” file. We therefore restrict both the BOG and NOG 
samples to veterans who have a start year between 1966 and 1971 inclusive, which 
reduces our sample to 1.9 million veterans.31 We further restrict attention to indi-
viduals born between 1946 and 1951 inclusive, with 1.5 million veterans remain-
ing. We next exclude approximately 150,000 veterans who have missing loss years, 
loss years before 1968, or loss years after 1985.32 We finally drop an additional 
8,000 veterans who are in SSA cells where not all veterans have the same birth 
year, at least one veteran in the cell has a start year before 1966 or after 1971, or 
at least one veteran in the cell has a loss year before 1968 or after 1985. Our final 
sample includes 1.351 million veterans of the US Army who began their service 
between 1966 and 1971 and were born between 1946 and 1951. For the analysis, we 
31 For the nearly 200,000 veterans with missing start years, we imputed their start year based on the median 
start year for other veterans in the sample with the same date of birth. This has little bearing on our final sample as 
nearly all veterans with missing start years have missing loss years and are therefore excluded from our analysis. 
32 Veterans found in the “loss year” file and the Vietnam file are in the BOG sample while veterans found in 
the “loss year” file but not the Vietnam file are assigned to the NOG sample. The Vietnam file contained loss year 
information for about 25 percent of veterans, which explains why a small fraction of the BOG sample has a loss year 
before 1968 or after 1985. Our final analysis sample contains a few veterans who were in the Vietnam file but not in 
the “loss year” file. This group comprises only 1.25 percent of our final sample and our results are nearly identical 
when we exclude them from our analysis. The “loss year” file does not include service members who died during 
service. US government archives record 38,224 Army service members who were killed in action in Vietnam. 
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 converted this final sample into a 1996–2007 panel of 15.2 million (year) × (indi-
vidual) observations, or 2.9 million (year) × (cell) observations.33
33 A veteran who dies in year t is dropped from the analysis sample in year t and in all subsequent years. Because 
year-of-death is one of the variables used when constructing cells, typically all members of a cell die in the same 
year (if any die). The number of surviving cells falls by approximately 4.8 percent from 1996 to 2007. 
Table A1—Percentage of DC Recipients and Average Annual Benefit  
by CDR and Service Era in 2006
CDR Panel A. All veterans Panel B. CDR distribution by service era
Recipients
Payments (2014  
$ millions)
Mean annual 
benefit Gulf Vietnam Korea WWII Peacetime
0% 14,291 $15 $1,046.32 0.1% 0.3% 2.4% 1.4% 0.4%
10% 775,346 $1,232 $1,588 27.3% 21.8% 30.6% 33.0% 37.3%
20% 417,721 $1,296 $3,102 17.8% 13.3% 13.0% 12.5% 17.8%
30% 334,931 $1,770 $5,286 15.3% 10.6% 12.4% 13.1% 11.0%
40% 259,834 $1,988 $7,652 12.5% 9.0% 8.2% 8.1% 8.0%
50% 161,568 $1,737 $10,749 7.2% 5.9% 5.4% 5.8% 4.7%
60% 184,264 $3,289 $17,849 7.0% 7.0% 7.6% 7.1% 5.7%
70% 165,257 $4,333 $26,218 4.8% 8.5% 5.5% 5.4% 4.2%
80% 113,404 $3,305 $29,143 3.4% 5.7% 4.1% 4.1% 2.7%
90% 60,546 $1,926 $31,818 1.7% 3.1% 2.3% 2.3% 1.4%
100% 238,662 $9,198 $38,541 3.0% 14.7% 8.5% 7.2% 7.0%
Average $11,038
Total   2,725,824 $30,089     694,813 947,598 159,804 328,044 595,565
notes: Data in the first three columns, from the US Department of Veterans Affairs 2006 Annual Benefits Report, 
provides the number of DC recipients, the total amount paid, and the average annual benefit payment (in 2014 dol-
lars) by combined disability rating (CDR) in September 2006. Data in panel B provide the share of DC recipients 
from each service era with each value of the CDR. Panel B data were obtained from the Department of Veterans 
Affairs following an email request.
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Figure A1. Evolution of ln(cell mean earnings) among BOG Relative to NOG Veterans,  
1996–2007: Birth Cohorts 1946–1948, 1949–1951
notes: This figure reports annual differences and 95 percent confidence intervals between the natural log of BOG 
earnings and the natural log of NOG earnings (multipled by 100) for 2 veteran birth cohorts: 1946–1948 and 1949–
1951. The vertical line indicates the year of the Agent Orange policy change. Each series is normalized to the BOG-
NOG difference in log earnings as of year 1996.
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Table A2—Evolution of Disability Compensation (DC) Benefits by Year of DC Enrollment
Year of 
enrollment
Outcome year
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
panel A. mean combined disability rating
1999 41.8 45.5 49.7 53.5 57.7 60.3 62.3 63.6 
2000 44.1 50.0 55.0 59.4 62.3 64.6 66.3 
2001 41.2 46.2 52.3 56.6 60.6 62.6 
2002 38.7 46.0 50.9 54.8 57.6 
2003 41.8 47.8 52.2 55.2 
2004 43.0 48.5 51.5 
2005 41.3 45.1 
2006 39.1 
panel B. mean annual DC payment
1999 10,948 12,781 14,622 15,989 17,606 18,645 19,393 20,143 
2000 11,904 14,527 16,351 18,044 19,230 20,120 21,037 
2001 10,883 12,807 15,234 16,987 18,626 19,630 
2002 9,766 12,634 14,601 16,136 17,431 
2003 10,822 13,218 14,974 16,360 
2004 11,295 13,437 14,756 
2005 10,503 12,116 
2006 9,746 
panel C. percentage receiving iU award or 100 CDr
1999 15.3 20.9 26.4 31.3 36.7 40.5 43.2 44.7 
2000 17.6 25.2 31.3 37.1 41.5 44.6 46.5 
2001 15.3 20.8 28.0 33.5 38.6 40.7 
2002 12.3 20.1 25.9 30.4 33.2 
2003 15.1 21.9 27.0 30.0 
2004 16.8 22.5 25.6 
2005 14.4 17.7 
2006 11.5 
panel D. percentage receiving compensation for diabetes
1999 0.8 1.1 2.5 7.9 11.0 12.4 13.8 14.8 
2000 0.5 2.3 9.4 12.1 13.4 14.6 15.8 
2001 15.3 37.6 38.6 39.4 39.9 40.4 
2002 58.5 59.0 59.5 59.7 59.9 
2003 48.6 49.1 49.6 50.1 
2004 42.7 43.7 44.5 
2005 39.9 40.8 
2006                 40.9 
notes: This table reports the progression of DC benefits for veterans in the sample described in Section III and the 
Data Appendix. Each row corresponds to a DC enrollment cohort. Each column corresponds to a particular year. 
In panel A, veterans with an IU award are given a CDR of 100. In panel B, mean annual DC payments are in 2014 
dollars. Although our data codes DC receipt in each year from 1998 through 2006, we can only determine the year 
a veteran enrolls in DC if the veteran is observed not receiving DC in a prior year. We thus identify DC enrollment 
cohorts from 1999 forward, but not 1998.
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Table A3—Comparison of Census and Army/SSA Demographics and Earnings Data for Year 1999
Panel A. Army/SSA  
verified sample (1999)
Panel B. Vietnam veterans born  
1946–1951: 2000 census
All Whites Nonwhites All Whites Nonwhites
    (1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3)
Age in 1999 50.5 50.5 50.3 50.7 50.7 50.5
(1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (1.6) (1.6) (1.6)
Race
 White 88.7 100.0 0.0 86.7 100.0 0.0
 Nonwhite 11.3 0.0 100.0 13.3 0.0 100.0
Education
 HS dropout 27.3 26.9 30.7 5.2 4.7 8.3
 HS grad. 43.6 42.9 49.2 39.3 39.1 41.0
 Some college 14.7 15.3 10.4 29.7 29.1 33.4
 College grad. 6.9 7.5 2.4 15.9 16.6 11.3
 More than college 0.4 0.5 0.1 9.9 10.5 6.0
Percent positive earnings 84.1 85.0 76.5 82.2 83.1 76.3
Annual earnings (2014 dollars)
 Mean (full sample) 53,365 55,457 36,969 59,436 61,897 43,395
(78,099) (82,212) (25,054) (66,283) (68,203) (49,121)
 Mean (if > 0) 62,043 63,919 47,322 72,313 74,493 56,842
(81,670) (85,973) (27,650) (66,438) (68,263) (48,951)
 Median (full sample) 46,270 47,889 34,428 49,734 50,019 36,946
Observations   1,286,921 1,141,340 145,581   203,781 178,601 25,180
notes: This table reports summary statistics for veterans in the SSA verified sample and veterans in the 2000 census. 
Panel A maintains the same sample restrictions described in the data appendix and further restricts to veterans who 
were still alive as of 1999. All statistics in panel A are from 1999. Panel B reports summary statistics for veterans 
in the 5 percent 2000 Census IPUMS extract who were born between 1946 and 1951.
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Table A4—Earnings Contrasts between BOG and NOG Veterans, 1996−2007: 
Mean Cell Earnings and Median Cell Earnings
Panel A.  
DV: Mean earnings
Panel B.  
DV: Mean earnings 
[trimmed sample]
Panel C.  
DV: Median earnings
  (1) (2)   (1) (2)   (1) (2)
BOG −3,229 −3,759 139 156 −1,515 −1,527 
(161) (345) (73) (74) (100) (101)
BOG × (YR-1996) −25 −70 −122 
(244) (11) (15)
BOG × (YR-2001) × (YR ≥ 2002) −31 −71 −68 
(438) (17) (25)
BOG × (YR97) −295 −46 −112 
(128) (29) (43)
BOG × (YR98) −660 −102 −274 
(168) (37) (54)
BOG × (YR99) −919 −178 −408 
(317) (43) (62)
BOG × (YR00) −3,500 −305 −530 
(2,022) (47) (67)
BOG × (YR01) −540 −388 −661 
(207) (51) (73)
BOG × (YR02) 1,758 −457 −782 
(3,277) (56) (80)
BOG × (YR03) −431 −570 −952 
(192) (59) (87)
BOG × (YR04) −572 −698 −1,105 
(209) (63) (91)
BOG × (YR05) −778 −912 −1,411 
(277) (66) (95)
BOG × (YR06) −1,337 −1,074 −1,562 
(313) (68) (99)
BOG × (YR07) −1,406 −1,195 −1,808 
(260) (71) (102)
r2 0.003 0.003 0.173 0.173 0.167 0.167 
Outcome mean (1996) 50,658 43,326 45,218 
Outcome standard deviation 275,309 18,353 27,209 
Observations (Cell) × (Year) 2,862,513   2,536,488   2,862,513 
notes: This table reports estimates of equations (1) and (2) where the dependent variable is the outcome indicated 
in each panel heading. Earnings values are in 2014 dollars. The trimmed sample in panel B excludes any cell that 
ever has a mean annual earnings level that exceeds the ninety-fifth percentile of annual cell mean earnings in any 
year between 1996 and 2007. (YR-1996) and (YR-2001) are linear time trends. All regressions include year fixed 
effects and fixed effects for each combination of (AFQT-quintile) × (year), (year of birth) × (year), and (race) × 
(year), where race is defined as white or nonwhite and veterans with a missing AFQT score are grouped into a sixth 
AFQT category. All regressions weight each observation according to the number of veterans in the cell. Standard 
errors, clustered on cell, are reported in parentheses.
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